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An outline for a model law is presented here that would govern the non-consensual treatment of people
who lack the capacity (or competence) to consent due to mental impairment4, whether this is due to
‘mental disorder’ or ‘psychiatric disorder’ as conventionally conceived, or due to a ‘physical disorder’. Our
aim in drafting this model law is to give coherent and practical expression to the case, previously made
by two of the current authors, that separate legislation authorising the civil commitment of ‘mentally
disordered’ persons is unnecessary, and discriminatory, and should be replaced by new, comprehensive
legislation that would govern the non-consensual treatment of both ‘mental’ and ‘physical’ conditions5.
This new scheme – which we have described as the ‘fusion’ proposal – would be based squarely on
incapacity principles: that is, on the impaired capacity of a person to make decisions about treatment,
from whatever cause – whether this is due to schizophrenia, Alzheimer’s Disease, a learning disability, a
confusional state due to infection, a cerebrovascular accident, a head injury, or any other mental
impairment. 
A model statute of this kind, drafted largely by Rowena Daw, is presented here in skeleton form.
Justifications for the ‘fusion’ proposal 
In the UK, as in most jurisdictions, treatment for ‘mental disorder’ is largely governed by mental health
legislation. Under that legislation, the usual criteria for intervention – by way of both detention and
involuntary treatment – are that the person concerned is ‘mentally disordered’ (or ‘mentally ill’) in the
necessary sense and that they present a serious risk to themselves or others. If a person meets those
complex criteria, the legislation will usually authorise their certification by medical practitioners, their
emergency detention and transportation to a hospital or clinic, their compulsory assessment, their
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2 Head of Policy, Royal College of Psychiatrists, 17 Belgrave Square, London, SW1X 8PG.
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involuntary psychiatric treatment, and their compulsory community care, provided the person’s
involuntary status as a whole is kept under regular, continuing review by a court or tribunal. Patients who
retain, or regain, their capacity to consent may still receive psychiatric treatment without their consent
as long as they remain involuntary patients under the scheme. 
When it comes to the treatment without consent of non-psychiatric medical conditions, on the other
hand, different criteria and different procedures are followed that are grounded in different sources of law.
Treatment without consent is not permitted for those with capacity; for those who lack capacity reliance
is placed on common law powers (or justifications) for intervention whose origins lie in the defence of
necessity in the law of crime and tort, or we act under adult guardianship (or incapacity) legislation, such
as the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA 2005). Under these regimes the fundamental criterion for
intervention is not the presence of any specific disorder or the imminent threat of harm. Instead, the test
for intervention is the incapacity of the person to make necessary treatment decisions. If the person lacks
that capacity, treatment that is in their ‘best interests’ may generally be provided without their consent. 
We have argued that the maintenance of these separate regimes is no longer acceptable. In particular, this
‘two-track’ approach is inconsistent with general principles of health care ethics and with basic notions
of human rights, particularly the right of people with mental disorders to be free of unnecessary
discrimination in the law. Mental disorder is not always associated with incapacity to consent, and the
capacity of mentally disordered people is already assessed for many other legal purposes. Furthermore,
there is good research evidence that the assessment of capacity in people with a ‘mental disorder’ is as
reliable as for those with a ‘physical disorder’6.
The ‘fusion’ framework
The alternative approach that we advocate is to abandon the two-track approach, and, instead, to fuse
the two together into a single comprehensive involuntary treatment scheme, which preserves the
strengths of each. A major strength of non-consensual treatment schemes that are based on incapacity
principles is the respect shown for the autonomy of those patients who retain their capacity; but these
schemes are, nevertheless, often weak on the regulation of emergency treatment powers, detention in
hospital, and forced treatment. These are the areas, in contrast, in which civil commitment schemes are
strong. The use of force, and the detention and involuntary treatment of objecting patients, is clearly
authorised and regulated by mental health legislation. We therefore advocate a legal regime that retains
the strengths of both, but still relies squarely on the incapacity of the person to make necessary care or
treatment decisions as the primary justification for intervention in their life. 
Our proposed ‘fusion’ legislation deals with all persons who lack capacity who may require treatment or
care; compulsory powers will only affect a subset of those covered. Provisions for the treatment and care
of informal patients include safeguards for those requiring ‘serious medical treatment’, protections for
informal patients in residential care, and requirements for informal patients lacking capacity who need to
be ‘deprived of their liberty’ in their best interests. A single regime is thus provided that specifies the
conditions for both treatment under compulsion and treatment under circumstances amounting to a
‘deprivation of liberty’. 
This paper demonstrates how we may fuse the central elements of these two distinct schemes into one
comprehensive piece of legislation. The basic criterion for intervention under ‘fused’ legislation is
6 Cairns R, Maddock C, Buchanan A, David AS, Hayward P, Richardson G, Szmukler G, Hotopf M. (2005) ‘Reliability of
mental capacity assessments in psychiatric in-patients’. British Journal of Psychiatry 187: 372–8. 
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incapacity to make necessary treatment decisions. The usual meaning of ‘incapacity’ applies: that is,
inability to understand, recall, process, use or weigh relevant information: inability to communicate a
decision; or inability to reach a decision that is sufficiently stable for it to be followed. This incapacity test
must be defined in a manner that is sufficiently flexible to cover the complex and subtle forms of
incapacity found in some mental disorders. The test is not linked to any specific disabling condition, even
if it is linked in a general manner to an impairment or disturbance in the function of the mind, as in
section 2(1) MCA 2005 for England and Wales. In addition, for intervention under this test to occur, no
less restrictive resolution of the apparent problems should be available.
In emergency circumstances, a ‘reasonable belief’ that the patient lacks capacity in this sense is sufficient
to authorise intervention. Suitably qualified professionals could then intervene, using similar powers to
those provided by a civil commitment scheme: that is, powers of entry, detention of the person,
transportation to assessment, use of reasonable force, and so on. 
The patient then enters a staggered compulsory assessment process, during which immediately necessary
treatment can be authorised. A more structured assessment of the patient’s capacity can then take place.
If the patient’s involuntary treatment is to continue, further downstream decisions about the details of
their treatment are required: decisions, for instance, concerning the need for their detention for
treatment purposes, the appropriate place of treatment – which includes the community – the contents
of the treatment plan, and the value of any continuing care.
Comprehensive review and accountability mechanisms also apply. All involuntary patients must have
ready access to rights advice and to independent review of their status before a court or tribunal. A
substitute decision-maker for treatment is appointed (and parameters for the patient’s treatment set).
Serious treatments require special regulation, through mandatory peer review of treatment, for instance.
But this kind of requirement does not apply only to psychiatric treatment; it should apply to all treatments
of a similarly controversial or intrusive kind.
In our proposed scheme, with some minor exceptions (see below), involuntary treatment is restricted to
patients who lack capacity. This does not preclude involuntary treatment for the protection of others,
which is permitted in two sets of circumstances – first, where treatment for the protection of others is in
the patient’s best interests, and second, where in the course of providing treatment in the best interests
of the patient, there arises a risk of harm to others.
Note that we are not advocating the intermediate (or hybrid) legal position now followed in many parts
of North America and continental Europe that involves the application of different legal criteria to the
detention and involuntary treatment decisions7. Under that approach, mental disorder and threat of
harm criteria may be applied to a person’s detention, while incapacity criteria may be applied to their
treatment. That approach has the significant disadvantage that it can lead to a position wherein a person
may be lawfully detained in a psychiatric facility on the basis of their mental disorder, but cannot then be
treated if they retain or regain their capacity to consent to psychiatric treatment. Instead, we argue that
the test of incapacity to consent should be applied to both a person’s detention and their involuntary
treatment. 
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Forensic care in the ‘fusion’ framework
The consequences of applying capacity principles to forensic care may appear problematic. The matter is
complicated by the existence of different categories of forensic patient – some on remand, some convicted
of criminal offences, some found not guilty by reason of insanity, or unfit to plead. The matter is also
complicated by the fact that some forensic patients can be returned to prison if they regain their capacity
and refuse treatment, while others cannot be returned to prison, because they are not currently subject
to a prison sentence. If the detention of a person in that latter group was no longer authorized, they would
have to be immediately released, which is an outcome that may not be politically or socially acceptable if
the person concerned is deemed to still present a serious risk of harm. 
This points to the fact that protecting the autonomy over treatment of patients with capacity is not the
only important ethical principle in this field. Another important principle concerns the need to protect
other people from serious harm. So some modification of pure capacity principles may be required in the
forensic field. 
Nevertheless, most of the difficulties in the forensic area can be overcome if the following principles are
applied. First, any mentally disordered offender with capacity who consents to their treatment could be
treated in an appropriate facility (and any sentence they were under could continue to run). Secondly,
any mentally disordered offender who lacks capacity could be treated involuntarily like any other
incapacitated patient. Thirdly, any criminal defendant found unfit to plead or not guilty due to insanity
might still be treated without their consent, even if they retain or regain their capacity, if certain
conditions apply: 
• the person has committed acts or omissions constituting a serious offence; and
• a serious mental impairment or disturbance has contributed significantly to that conduct; and
• an effective treatment can be offered that could be expected to reduce the risk of that disorder’s
reoccurrence.
This compromises pure incapacity principles, in narrowly defined circumstances, in order to prevent harm
to others. It may also be the most humane disposal, as the option of prison would be inappropriate for a
person with a mental impairment of such severity, and indeed would be impossible without a conviction.
However, we believe that the number of persons likely to fall into this category who retain capacity is
extremely small.
Further we propose that a mentally impaired offender who has been convicted of a serious criminal
offence could be sentenced to the usual period of imprisonment, but if they were found to lack capacity
and need treatment, they could be transferred to hospital for necessary care. If capacity is regained in
hospital, the person has the choice of continuing treatment with consent; if not, the person would be
transferred to prison for the remainder of their sentence. An alternative position, which we are not
proposing in our draft statute, is that a convicted person could be placed under a hospital order on
disposition from the criminal court, and be directed immediately to psychiatric treatment for a limited
term, proportionate to the seriousness of their offence. During that limited term involuntary treatment
could proceed on the same conditions, specified above, as would apply to those found not guilty by reason
of insanity or unfit to plead; that is, treatment could be given involuntarily even for someone who has
capacity, under the specified conditions. This would be a pragmatic response to society’s demand that a
person who has committed a serious offence – even with a mental disorder, and even one that might
respond rapidly to treatment – should be detained for a proportionate time. We have proposed the former
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option to preserve as far as possible the centrality of incapacity as the justification for involuntary
treatment. But we also retain the option of disposal to a compulsory treatment order without a concurrent
sentence, which would deem the person to be subject to an equivalent civil order, and which would be
terminated by the responsible clinician when the necessary conditions were no longer met.
In the manner outlined above, capacity principles can be followed in most forms of forensic care, subject
to some limited modifications that would be required to respect the competing ethical principle of
preventing serious harm to others.
The Northern Ireland Bamford Review (2007)8, with which our proposals share much in common, took
an uncompromising approach to the forensic aspects, recommending that only people who lack capacity
should be subject to a statute that authorises treatment without consent. We might favour the Bamford
position, if their suggestion were adopted that there should be a “new legislative framework to incorporate
future measures in relation to the risks posed by people suffering from an impairment or dysfunction of
mind within a wider and independent risk management framework that addresses the full range of people
who pose a risk of serious harm to the public” (p 79); that is, within a framework that does not
discriminate against those with mental disorders. Whether such a scheme would be politically acceptable
in England and Wales, or, in the absence of an offence, would be compatible with the European
Convention on Human Rights, is questionable.
Our precedents
It is not possible in a paper of this type to present a fully drafted statute, but we have attempted to provide
sufficient detail in key areas to show that the concept of fused legislation can be given coherent
expression. We take as our base the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA 2005) for England and Wales. The
recommendations of the Richardson Committee (1999)9 established to review the Mental Health Act
1983 for England and Wales (MHA 1983) have also been influential, as has the Mental Health (Care and
Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, which incorporates an ‘impaired decision making’ criterion into a civil
commitment regime. Other concepts are drawn from the MHA 1983, from proposals of the Mental
Health Alliance for new mental health legislation10, and from the draft mental health bills of 2002 and
200411, which appeared during the law reform process. In the event, these drafts met with substantial
resistance and a different Mental Health Act 2007 was eventually passed for England and Wales (MHA
2007). This act substantially amends the MHA 1983 but is not based on incapacity principles. 
In addition, we have drawn on the report of the Bamford Review of Mental Health and Learning
Disability for Northern Ireland12, which recommended the adoption of a ‘comprehensive legislative
framework’ for non-consensual treatment that is very similar to our fusion proposal.
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Some outstanding issues
Many other contentious matters besides those relating to patients’ capacity arise, of course, in the design
of non-consensual treatment legislation. Many of these matters were extensively debated during the law
reform processes that preceded the passage of the MCA 2005 and the MHA 2007. Should a ‘treatability’
or a ‘best interests’ test be included? Should compulsory treatment in the community be authorised?
Should the ‘responsible clinician’ always be a medical practitioner (except where the expertise of a
medical practitioner is clearly required, to comply for example with requirements of the European
Convention on Human Rights). What is the right structure and frequency for the process of independent
review? Should elected politicians continue to exercise statutory powers over the release of forensic
patients?
Some position must be taken on such issues when a model statute is designed. In our model statute, we
have included both a treatability and a best interests test as preconditions for intervention; our statute
would authorise compulsory community treatment; and we have given tribunals the power to direct the
release of some forensic patients. Some contentious positions have therefore been taken that go beyond
the capacity issue and each would require extended justification. Regrettably, due to the constraints of
space, we do not have the opportunity to present those justifications here.
This omission is not fatal to our current purposes, however. Our current aim is not to convince readers
of the correctness of our model law on every point of detail. It is to demonstrate that our fusion proposal
could be turned from concept to reality. The draft model law we present here is sufficient, we believe, to
make this point: that our fusion proposal can proceed from drawing board to prototype. This prototype
needs to be located in a particular jurisdiction, with whose wider laws it must be integrated. We have
chosen for this purpose the jurisdiction of England and Wales.
We accept that some details of our model law will be contentious for some readers. If they would only
want to change the details, however, we would have succeeded in our primary task: making a case that a
comprehensive statute giving effect to our fusion proposal could be satisfactorily drafted, with only
arguments of detail to remain. We hope we have convinced readers of this and have shown that a non-
consensual treatment statute, applicable to both ‘physical’ and ‘mental’ disorders, could be constructed
satisfactorily on the foundation of an incapacity test. 
An outline of the Model Statute 
We now discuss the general principles behind each major aspect of the model statute. It is in eight parts.
I THE PRINCIPLES
We have included an opening statement of principles because these are helpful to practitioners in
exercising their powers and duties, to courts in interpreting the law and to individuals who may be
affected by the provisions in giving them confidence in the purpose of the law.
The ‘best interests’ principle applies to any act done, or decision made, under the Act for or on behalf
of a person who lacks capacity, unless different principles are applied by specific provisions of the Act. The
specific provisions cover exceptional instances where contrary actions may be justified by the competing
ethical requirement for the protection of others. This occurs in the forensic section (Part VI; Clause 45)
where a person found ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’ or ‘unfit to plead’, but who has capacity, may be
detained in hospital if a number of further conditions are met.
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The protection of others is also addressed in Clause 4 (10). When a patient’s treatment is authorised in
his or her best interests, but during the course of such treatment a serious threat of harm is posed to
another person, the patient may be provided with such treatment as is immediately necessary to prevent
such harm occurring and is proportionate to the likely seriousness of that harm. 
In many cases where a person lacking capacity may present a danger to others, it will, of course, be in that
person’s best interests that this harm be prevented.
II GENERAL PROVISIONS
This part of the Act provides definitions for the terms and concepts that underpin the main provisions.
The definition of capacity generally follows that of the MCA, but is broader in referring to the ability of
a person to ‘appreciate’ the necessary information. This will give clearer recognition of the fact that a
person may be able to use information for some purposes but still not be able appreciate the manner in
which the information pertains to their own situation. 
Further elaboration of the concept of capacity could be provided in an accompanying Code of Practice
which would make it clear that a person is to be regarded as able to understand the information relevant
to a decision if he or she can understand an explanation provided in a way that is appropriate to the
circumstances (for instance, by using simple language or visual aids or any other means). It should also
make clear that relevant information includes information about the reasonably foreseeable
consequences of deciding one way or another, or failing to make the decision.
The concept of best interests is a central concept underpinning the Act and requires full elucidation.
The formulation of best interests follows that in the MCA. It makes the person’s wishes, feelings and
values a primary consideration. Nevertheless, a decision may be in a person’s best interests although it is
not in accordance with the person’s present wishes, and although the person objects to the treatment. 
The general requirement to consult relevant people with respect to a person’s best interests applies
throughout the Act but this is supplemented in different clauses by additional consultation requirements.
The ‘general authority’ permits people caring for a person who lacks capacity to do certain routine acts
without requiring specific authority under other provisions. A proportionate degree of restraint of the
person in their best interests is permitted under this section. The general authority covers such routine
acts for all patients lacking capacity, including those receiving care or treatment under Part IV, V or VI
of the Act. A similar form of authority was previously provided by the justification of ‘necessity’ under the
common law. 
Generally, where medication is to be administered over the person’s objection, or to prevent harm to
others, the compulsory treatment process under Part V should be initiated. Medication may only be
administered using force under the ‘general authority’ if it is immediately necessary to prevent serious
harm to the patient. In the case of persons treated under Parts IV, V, or VI it applies to medication that
is not authorised under an approved care plan.
III SERIOUS MEDICAL TREATMENT
This Part is intended to ensure protections for the patient who lacks capacity who is to receive treatment
that is ‘serious’ because it is particularly invasive, irreversible or likely to carry special risks. Some
treatments of this kind are listed – ECT or medication under the Act lasting beyond three months; others
may be specified in Regulations.
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Before treatment is provided it is important to seek the agreement of the substitute decision maker
(SDM) for the person. In the absence of such a person, or the ability to appoint such a person, an
advocate must be appointed so that the person’s interests are independently represented. The person’s
primary carer should also be consulted.
It is not considered appropriate that serious medical treatment should go ahead immediately if there is a
disagreement between the clinician and the substitute decision maker or primary carer. Here the opinion
of a second opinion approved doctor must be sought. The clause also gives a SDM, advocate or primary
carer the right to seek a second opinion. 
IV PROTECTIONS FOR INFORMAL PATIENTS LACKING CAPACITY
AND NEEDING CARE AND TREATMENT13
This Part applies to people who lack capacity in relation to their care and treatment and who are in
hospital or a care home (or are going to be admitted to residential care). In addition, they must be in
residential care for a period of at least 28 days. They should not be people for whom the compulsory
assessment and treatment process should be initiated under Part V.
If these conditions are satisfied following examination by an approved clinician, a responsible clinician
must be appointed, a care plan provided and the person registered with an appropriate authority (for
instance, the local authority). Before completing the care plan the responsible clinician must consult the
persons’s SDM or primary carer. The care plan must be regularly reviewed. 
If the person needs to be deprived of liberty in his or her best interests, extra conditions apply. The
person must be examined by a medical practitioner and another health or social care practitioner to
decide if the conditions are met, including that the person has an impairment or disturbance in the
functioning of mind and that deprivation of liberty is a proportionate response to the harm the person is
likely to suffer if not so deprived. A right of appeal to the Mental Capacity Tribunal is included. These
conditions should satisfy the ECHR’s requirements resulting from the case of HL (2004).14
V COMPULSORY PROVISION OF CARE AND TREATMENT15
Before a person is placed under compulsory care and treatment a set of conditions must be met. These
provide a proper legal basis for a person to be treated involuntarily and to be detained, if necessary, for
treatment to occur. 
Illustrating the value of the ‘fusion’ approach, impaired capacity is a necessary condition, but the
processes of emergency assessment and treatment, detention, the use of force, and compulsory treatment
are clearly regulated. 
The conditions are: 1. the person has an impairment or dysfunction of the mind; 2. the person lacks
capacity to make a decision about his or her care or treatment; 3. the person needs care or treatment in
his or her best interests; 4. the person objects to the decision or act that is proposed in relation to his or
her care or treatment and that decision or act is not authorised by the ‘general authority’; 5. the proposed
13 Following a consideration of the commentaries on the statute, we propose a number of amendments that simplify Part IV. These
are presented in the Addendum at the end of the Model Law
14 HL v UK (2005) EHRR 32.
15 We also propose possible amendments to Part V that simplify the process of compulsory treatment, also presented in the
Addendum at the end of the Model Law.
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objective cannot be achieved in a less restrictive fashion; 6. treatment is available that is likely to alleviate
or prevent a deterioration in the person’s condition; and, 7. the exercise of compulsory powers is a
necessary and proportionate response to the risk of harm posed to the person or any other person, and to
the seriousness of that harm, if the care or treatment is not provided. 
Compulsory treatment follows a staggered set of phases, although not every patient will pass through all
of them: 1. Preliminary Examination (up to 24 hours); 2. Initial Assessment (up to 7 days); 3. Assessment
Order (up to 28 days); and, 4. Compulsory Treatment Order (up to 6 months). The assessments and
compulsory treatment order can apply either in hospital or, if it is judged safe and effective, in the
community.
1 Preliminary Examination
If there is a reasonable request for a person to be assessed and a medical practitioner, after examining the
person, considers the necessary conditions appear to be met, the person may be detained in hospital for
up to 24 hours and urgent treatment provided. Appointment of a responsible clinician and
consultation with the primary carer or SDM are provided for, along with the need to advise of the
availability of advocates. 
There are also powers for the Police to take a person to a place of safety, if necessary, by entering
private premises. The conditions for the latter are that the person appears to lack capacity; and is being,
ill treated or neglected, or kept otherwise than under proper control, or, while living alone, is unable to
care for himself or herself and is in need of care and attention. The phrase ‘under proper control’ could
cover concern about the risk to another person in the household. A warrant must be issued by a justice
for such entry. There is also a power to convey the person to hospital. 
2 Initial Assessment
After 24 hours of Preliminary Examination, the person must be discharged unless a second mental health
professional examines the person and determines that the conditions for Initial Assessment are met. The
person can then be assessed and given urgent treatment for a further 7 days. This can take place either
in hospital or in the community to which the person can be returned. 
During the Preliminary Assessment and Initial Assessment, treatment to which the patient objects may
be given to save life or prevent serious and immediate deterioration in the person’s health or to protect
another person from harm. (Treatment under the General Authority may also be given, and if ‘serious
treatment’ is to be given it is subject to the conditions noted above (Part III)).
3 Assessment Order
In order for a person to be assessed and treated for longer than a total of 8 days it will be necessary for a
Tribunal to authorise a further period of detention. A single person Tribunal can authorise a period of
detention for up to 28 days. Before applying for such an order the responsible clinician must prepare a
preliminary care plan in consultation with the SDM or primary carer. The Assessment Order shall state
the length of the assessment period and the treatment proposed. It also includes the appointment of the
SDM if there is not one already. 
If assessment is to take place in the community this shall include a limited set of conditions that will
need to be placed on the person in order for treatment to take place or to protect the health and safety
19
A model law fusing incapacity and mental health legislation
of the patient or other persons. There is a requirement for consultation with the person (unless
inappropriate or impractical), the SDM and any person who will have care of the patient in the
community. The responsible clinician has a power of recall to hospital.
Treatment may be given without the consent of the patient if it is included in the approved care plan, is
covered by the General Authority, or needs to be provided as a matter of urgency in order to save the
patient’s life or to prevent a serious and imminent deterioration in the patient’s health.
In some circumstances such a period of further assessment under an Assessment Order will be
unnecessary and it will be appropriate to apply directly for a Compulsory Treatment Order (see below).
In that case the hearing must be before a full Tribunal. There are restrictions on the right to apply directly
for a compulsory treatment order. It may only be made where the SDM agrees or the patient is an existing
patient of the relevant health service.
4 Compulsory Treatment Order
A Compulsory Treatment Order is made by a Full Tribunal, consisting of a legal, medical and lay member,
and may last for up to 6 months. The order will be based on the recommendations of a medical
practitioner and another health or social care professional that the conditions are met. If the order is
to take place in the community the order will include conditions, possibly including proportionate
restrictions on the person’s conduct and freedom of movement. Before deciding that a person shall be a
compulsory patient in the community the responsible clinician must be satisfied that this would be
compatible with safe and effective care, and that appropriate treatment is available. The patient’s views
must be considered, as well as that of the SDM and carer. 
Before applying for the order a written care plan shall be drafted, in consultation with the SDM and the
primary carer. The Tribunal must authorise the care plan, and may make amendments to it, but if these
include changes to the treatment regime they should be approved by the Responsible Clinician and the
medical member of the Tribunal. Copies of the care plan must be provided to the patient and the SDM. 
Subsequent changes may be made to the care plan with the agreement of the SDM. Any changes to the
compulsory treatment provisions or to the conditions attached to the patient’s treatment in the
community, or a change in the location of treatment, must have the agreement of the SDM. If the SDM
does not agree it is necessary to obtain the approval of a doctor appointed to give a second opinion.
Treatment may be given without the consent of the patient if it is included in the approved care plan, or
is covered by the General Authority, or needs to be provided as a matter of urgency in order to save the
patient’s life or to prevent a serious and imminent deterioration in the patient’s health.
A Compulsory Treatment Order can be renewed or discharged by the Tribunal.
VI FORENSIC PROVISIONS
The Forensic provisions deal with a situation in which a person with an apparent impairment or
dysfunction of mind comes before a criminal court charged with an offence and is then remanded for
assessment or treatment, or convicted of the offence. These provisions also cover situations in which an
accused person is found unfit to stand trial or ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’. 
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1 Remand for report on mental condition or for treatment
A person who is charged with an offence may be sent to hospital for a report on his or her mental
condition or be remanded to hospital for treatment at any time before the conclusion of their trial. Such
assessment or treatment may also take place on bail. If the person has capacity, this must occur with their
consent; if the person lacks capacity, it must be in the person’s best interests. 
The duration of an order for treatment in these circumstances is limited to 6 months. The person or their
SDM may request a second medical opinion as to whether the conditions are met. 
During a remand to hospital, treatment may be provided to a person with their consent; or, in urgent
circumstances (where it is necessary to save life or prevent serious and immediate deterioration in the
person’s health, or to protect another person from harm) when there are reasonable grounds to believe
the person lacks the capacity to consent. For the incapable patient the General Authority applies. The
Tribunal, as the authority on capacity, best interests and definitions of impairment or dysfunction of
mind, has the power to discharge a remand order and the person has the right to seek a second medical
opinion.
2 Persons convicted of an offence
A person convicted of an offence may be put on a hospital order with a concurrent criminal sentence,
with that sentence continuing to run while the person is treated in hospital. Where the person lacks
capacity, he or she may be treated under this regime without consent. However, for the person who
retains capacity, the regime is consensual; the person must agree to the treatment order being made and
to any treatment provided. If that agreement is withdrawn, the person will be transferred to prison, or
released into the community, to serve the remainder of their sentence. The Tribunal has the power to
discharge from this treatment order but the person would then be required to serve the remainder of his
or her criminal sentence. 
The court may also decide to impose a hospital order alone, without a concurrent sentence, if that is
considered a satisfactory disposition of the case. The effect of this order is to deem the person to be
subject to a Compulsory Treatment Order under Part V. Treatment could then take place in hospital or
the community. The person would have to be released from that order by the responsible clinician or
Tribunal in the usual way, if the necessary conditions ceased to apply, and that possibility should be taken
into account by the criminal court when deciding to impose an order under this clause.
3 Persons found not guilty by reason of insanity or unfit to plead
The court may order the person’s detention in hospital if it considers it in the interests of the person or
to protect the safety of other persons. Where the court orders detention in hospital, treatment can be
given in the patient’s best interests, if the patient lacks capacity. However, for this group of patients, an
exception is made concerning involuntary treatment for a person who has capacity. Treatment may be
given to such a person where the responsible clinician is satisfied that: the person needs treatment in his
or her own interests or for the protection of others; and the person is suffering from an impairment or
dysfunction of mind that contributed significantly to the offence; and, that treatment is available that is
likely to reduce the risk of recurrence of such an offence. 
Alternatively, for such persons, a Compulsory Treatment Order can be made deeming them to subject
to compulsory treatment under Part V, as a civil patient, provided the conditions are met.
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4 Transfer from prison to hospital
A person may be transferred from prison to hospital where he or she has an impairment or disturbance
of mind and requires treatment and where, having capacity, the person consents to the treatment, or
where, lacking capacity, the treatment is in the person’s best interests.
A person who is accused or convicted of an offence and becomes subject to the provisions of this Part
should have the same rights to a SDM, a care plan and an advocate as those who are subject to Parts III,
IV and V. More detail on such matters would be included in a full statute.
VII MENTAL CAPACITY TRIBUNAL
The Act establishes a Mental Capacity Tribunal with both original and appellate jurisdiction. The
Primary Division will hear most cases at first instance and will sit as a 3 person Tribunal except when
otherwise provided. The Appeal Division will hear appeals from the Primary Division.
VIII PATIENT SAFEGUARDS
This Part of the Act deals with an essential patient safeguard, the substitute decision maker (SDM). An
adult with capacity may appoint an SDM to take decisions about his or her care or treatment in the event
of loss of capacity. An SDM may also be appointed by the Tribunal.
Advocates play a key role under the Act and must be made available to people who are subject to its
provisions. The Act specifies the functions of advocates and places responsibilities on authorities to
ensure they are appointed.
Advance decisions to refuse treatment must be signed and witnessed by a person when the person has
capacity. They apply when the person has lost capacity but have effect as if the person had capacity to
make the decision over any health care issue to which the advance decision applies. So long it is clearly
applicable to the circumstances the advance decision has effect as if the person had the capacity to make
such a decision at the later time. Such decisions may still be overridden when treatment without the
consent of the person is expressly authorised by the Act. A clause should be added concerning a process
for replacing a SDM should that be required.
The full model statute we have drafted to illustrate the viability of the fusion proposal, is produced
towards the end of this issue.
Journal of Mental Health Law Special issue
22
